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PROPERTY BEYOND EXCLUSION
LEE ANNE FENNELL*
ABSTRACT
Property rights have long been associated with a simple and dis-
tinctive technology: exclusion. But technologies can become outdated
as conditions change, and exclusion is no exception. Recent decades
have featured profound changes that have made exclusion a less use-
ful, less necessary, and more expensive way of regulating access to
resources. This Article surveys the prospects for a post-exclusion un-
derstanding of real and personal property. It proceeds from the pre-
mise that property is built upon complementarities, the nature and
scale of which have undergone seismic shifts. Physical boundaries
and lengthy claims on resources are designed to group complemen-
tary elements together in time and space in order to generate value.
But many of the most important complementarities are now found
not within a given owner’s holdings but among the holdings of dif-
ferent owners. Moreover, as slices of on-demand access increasingly
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replace lumpy long-term possessory interests, the presumed strong
complementarity associated with temporal continuity and spatial
contiguity begins to break down. This Article shows how these trends
have made property lines an increasingly poor mechanism for group-
ing together complements. It then considers how property rights
might move beyond exclusion, and addresses some implications and
objections.
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INTRODUCTION
Property rights have long been associated with a distinctive
technology: exclusion.1 The idea is intuitive and the architecture is
straightforward.2 The owner can keep out others, which enables her
to use her property as she likes, and enjoy or suffer whatever con-
sequences follow.3 Yet if we understand property as a human
invention designed to optimize access to resources, then exclusion
is not an inevitable defining feature of property, but just one pos-
sible mechanism for carrying out property’s work. And, like any
other technology, it can become outdated as conditions change.
Recent decades have featured profound changes in technologies for
managing resources.4 Increasing urbanization has also dramatic-
ally altered how property generates value and imposes costs. These
changes have made exclusion a less useful, less necessary, and more
expensive way of regulating access to resources and the streams of
benefits they produce.
This Article examines the prospects for a post-exclusion under-
standing of real and personal property.5 I proceed from the premise
that property is built upon complementarities,6 the nature and scale
of which have undergone seismic shifts. Physical boundaries and
lengthy claims on resources are designed to group together, in time
and space, elements that work together in producing value.7 Doing
1. See, e.g., William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England 2 (1766);
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691,
1692-94, 1699-1700 (2012) (proposing an “architectural” understanding of property).
3. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
356 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 224-25 (2016).
5. I will not take on intellectual property here, although some of what I say about exclu-
sion applies in that context as well.
6. Goods are complements if they are more valuable when consumed together, like left
and right shoes. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 184 (6th ed.
2012). Likewise, some property entitlements and attributes gain value when combined. See
Smith, supra note 2, at 1703 (observing that “[p]roperty clusters complementary attributes”
within pieces of land and owned objects).
7. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1693 (“Property organizes this world into lumpy packages
of legal relations—legal things—by setting boundaries around useful attributes that tend to
be strong complements.”).
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so allows owners to internalize the effects of that consolidated value-
production system.8 But many of the most important complemen-
tarities are found not within a given owner’s holdings, but among
the holdings of different owners.9 Moreover, as time-slices of on-
demand access increasingly replace enduring lumps of possession,10
the presumed strong complementarity between possession today
and possession tomorrow begins to break down. As a result of these
trends, property lines have become an increasingly poor technology
for grouping together complements.
My analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I considers how boundary
exclusion works. I frame exclusion as a prophylactic mechanism
designed to simultaneously enable and disable human endeavors by
controlling entry into a boundary-defined space. Exclusion enables
projects and investments by protecting resources in temporally
continuous and spatially contiguous chunks. Exclusion also disables
uninvited others from using the property, or any portion thereof, for
their own projects. This arrangement works well when the resources
located within the property’s lines are more tightly connected to
each other than they are to resources lying outside those lines.
Increasingly, however, a boundary exclusion strategy turns out to
be both underinclusive and overinclusive in grouping together com-
plements.
Part II examines the problems that interdependence among
property holdings pose for a boundary exclusion strategy.11 As prop-
erty values come to depend primarily on activities occurring outside
the owned parcel, exclusion becomes less effective in encouraging
property investments and in discouraging harmful property-related
behaviors. For similar reasons, one of the primary implications of an
exclusion-centric model—the owner’s right to veto any proposed
transfer—has become more socially costly. Complementarities
8. See id.
9. For example, a group of shops together generates more foot traffic than they would if
widely separated, a close-knit neighborhood produces benefits for the residents that would be
lost if the neighborhood were broken up, and an access path that crosses a set of beachfront
properties is far more valuable if it is contiguous.
10. See, e.g., Davidson & Infranca, supra note 4, at 216.
11. Although these problems can be largely cast as ones of underinclusiveness (boundaries
fail to capture the full set of complements), overinclusiveness is also implicated insofar as
property rights grant owners broader and more durable vetoes than would be socially optimal
given the interdependence among properties.
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among properties allow owners to monopolize resources that rep-
resent crucial inputs to the projects of others. Examples include
holdout problems that thwart efforts at land assembly, as well as
deadlocks between neighbors over resources or rights that each con-
trols. The resulting costs have prompted exercises of eminent
domain and other changes in the way that property rights are pro-
tected against involuntary transfer.
Part III turns to the connections within property holdings that an
exclusion strategy presupposes. Lumpy, long-term ownership rights
are premised on complementarities over time and across space with
respect to possession of an asset. New technologies for transacting
over excess capacity are beginning to make continuity of ownership
less important, however, and may also change the physical scale at
which property is best held. Examples can be found in the “sharing
economy” (better termed the “slicing economy”),12 and in new forms
of “smart property” capable of self-executing conditional claims on
resources.13 Yet continuity and contiguity remain important in many
contexts; there are latent advantages to full-strength ownership and
limits to new on-demand models.
Part IV considers how property rights might move beyond exclu-
sion, and addresses some implications and objections. One concern
is worth flagging at the outset: an inquiry like mine risks entangling
functional questions about how best to arrange access to resources
with semantic questions about the scope of words such as “exclu-
sion” and “property.” Although the Article’s framing (and title)
depend on the particular definitional choices I make, my ultimate
concern is with the former. Whether or not one’s concept of “prop-
erty” logically contains a region “beyond exclusion,” there is no
question that changes are afoot in how people derive value from
12. There has been much discussion in the literature about the inaptness of the term
“sharing economy,” although many writers continue to use it because it has gained such
currency in the United States. See, e.g., Davidson & Infranca, supra note 4, at 216 & n.1.
“Slicing” better captures market transactions that deliver thin, sequential servings of access.
13. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313,
335-37 (2017) (noting the potential for “dynamic transactions around physical objects (smart
property)” and describing examples of automatic changes in access); Nick Szabo, Smart
Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets (1996), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/
InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/
smart_contracts_2.html [https://perma.cc/PN3V-WDWP] (discussing how to “extend the
concept of smart contracts to property”).
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resources. This Article is concerned with how best to respond to
those changes.
I. UNDERSTANDING EXCLUSION
An exclusion strategy places a sharp discontinuity at the property
line.14 This setup is premised on the boundary doing a reasonably
good job of bundling together complementary elements.15 Like the
boundaries of a firm, property lines are designed to mark off re-
sources that are most efficiently managed together.16 As that
analogy suggests, property lines do not imply isolation; transactions
can and do occur across boundaries.17 Moreover, property law sup-
plements exclusion with governance strategies such as nuisance
law, as Henry Smith has emphasized.18 But the core move of exclu-
sion presumes that there is something significant about boundary
crossings that makes preventing them a good proxy for protecting
what gives property value.19
Although this Article suggests that exclusion is becoming less
efficacious and more costly, it remains a workhorse strategy.
Highlighting what exclusion is meant to do makes it easier to see
how it can misfire or fail. Section A below describes how the bound-
ary exclusion approach works, and Section B examines the purposes
it might serve.
14. Henry Smith has described this discontinuity as an “on/off” binary. Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1753-54 (2004). Yet it may at times work
as a less absolute “inflection point.” David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 753, 757-58 (2019); see also LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 13 (2009)
(observing that despite robust protection for the home, “strong exclusion from the parcel’s
edges would be unworkable, even ludicrous”).
15. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 1693, 1703.
16. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937) (discussing
efficient firm boundaries). For the application of analogous ideas to real property, see, for
example, Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332-34 (1993).
17. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1333-34; Demsetz, supra note 3, at 356-58.
18. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S455 (2002).
19. See FENNELL, supra note 14, at 12-13.
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A. How Boundary Exclusion Works
Boundary exclusion, as I use the term, corresponds to popular
notions of what it means to own property—the capacity to keep
everyone else off. It is perhaps best signified by the image of a fence
surrounding a parcel of real property.20 No fence can keep out all
intruders, but as Carol Rose’s work emphasizes, the fence commu-
nicates a message: “This is mine.”21 Or, more bluntly, “Keep out!”22
Where property rights are formalized and made a matter of public
record, property lines communicate the same thing, even without a
fence.23 In a legal regime that protects private property rights, that
message is not just cheap talk; it is backed by the force of law.24 The
law can coercively stop interlopers or impose penalties large enough
to deter entry.
An important feature of property boundaries is that they operate
in rem—“against the world”—locking out all but those whom the
owner chooses to admit.25 The in rem character of property rights
generates great savings in transaction costs: it is not necessary to
strike a deal with every person in the universe about not entering
the property, because the fact of ownership automatically generates
a broad-based right to exclude everyone else.26 This generalized
right of exclusion leaves the owner free to pursue her own projects
in peace, to reap the rewards from good investments or lucky gam-
bles, to bear the losses from any experiments that go awry, and,
above all, to stay put for however long she chooses to wait for her
bets to pay off.27
20. See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 1 (1994) (noting that a fence is
one of the “common images” that property brings to mind).
21. Id.
22. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 978 (2004).
23. Some form of posting or physical marking may, however, be required in order for the
owner to fully vindicate her exclusion right. See Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the
Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 951-53 (2013).
24. See Smith, supra note 22, at 974.
25. See, e.g., Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus
Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 33 (2012); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 790-97 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Chang & Smith, supra note 25, at 33; Merrill & Smith, supra note 25, at 790-
97.
27. See Smith, supra note 14, at 1729 (“[O]wners make bets in situations of uncertainty
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Boundary exclusion is inherently prophylactic. Interference with
the uses of the owner by the activities of other parties could be ad-
dressed in other ways, and different arrangements could be made to
pair inputs with outcomes.28 Exclusion attempts to block interfer-
ence before it has a chance to begin by preventing the simultaneous
presence of parties who might have conflicting agendas for the same
resource.29 This strategy does not always work, for reasons discuss-
ed below.30 But where it does succeed, it does so through the broad-
brush tactic of keeping people from being physically present, rather
than by regulating the things that they do while present.31
By focusing on presence rather than acts, boundary exclusion is
overbroad by design.32 The degree of overbreadth depends on how
completely and permanently boundaries exclude. At a fine enough
grain, presence becomes an almost perfect proxy for interference,
without any need to inquire into the nature of the competing acts.
When your fingers are physically present in a gripping configura-
tion on an apple in my orchard at the very moment I am trying to
pick that same apple, that presence is an interference. It matters
little whether your goal in gripping the apple is to assess its weight
and ripeness, adjust its angle for a better view for a picture you are
drawing of it, or, indeed, pluck it for immediate consumption—you
are in my way, regardless. A form of exclusion that was so finely
specified as to keep grasping fingers off individual apples at partic-
ular apple-harvesting moments would not be notably overbroad in
and are rewarded or punished depending on how those bets turn out later when the uncer-
tainty is resolved.”); see also infra Part I.B. (detailing the purposes of exclusion).
28. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1333-34.
29. See Smith, supra note 18, at S457-58.
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. This distinction tracks the one that Henry Smith draws between exclusion and
governance. See Smith, supra note 18, at S454-56, S467-78; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth
Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1494 (2007) (book review) (discussing Smith’s
distinction and observing that “you can control what users of the resource do or, as a sub-
stitute, control what kinds of people get to use the resource”); see also William C. Powers, Jr.,
A Methodological Perspective on the Duty to Act, 57 TEX. L. REV. 523, 526 (1979) (book review)
(“In their polar forms, ownership and reasonable use are contrary methods of allocating
resources.”).
32. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 14, at 13. But see Arthur Ripstein, Possession and Use,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 156, 157 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith
eds., 2013) (rejecting the idea that possession backed by exclusion is “an overinclusive proxy
for something else”).
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its operation. But that is not how boundary exclusion typically
works.33
Instead, exclusion implies a categorical rather than fine-grained
scope of operation, and a set of boundaries that endures over time
rather than being continually drawn and redrawn moment by mo-
ment in response to the owner’s unfolding plans. While it is not
impossible to apply the word “exclusion” to a dynamic set of pro-
tocols keyed to specific circumstances, the term typically refers to a
broad “keep out” strategy that is characterized by physical contigu-
ity and spatial continuity.34 Owners can of course allow others onto
their properties as they choose. But the background right to exclude
against which these arrangements are made typically confers
control of some reasonably contiguous polygon of space over a rela-
tively lengthy chunk of time.35 Finer-grained, context-specific
arrangements layered on top of that default generally travel under
the heading of “governance.”36
One might disagree as a definitional matter about when, or even
whether, finer specification or slicing of interests ceases to count as
exclusion. Nonetheless, the overbreadth described above character-
izes property regimes on the ground, and it is something that
modern technology and social conditions may increasingly squeeze
out. The analysis here explores the implications of that potential
squeeze-out. Although I use the term “exclusion” to refer to the
feature of property’s architecture that generates the overbreadth,
nothing turns on whether one prefers to use a different and more
specific term to refer to the strategy of demarcating an enduring
area that the owner is entitled to control mere presence within,
regardless of what interlopers mean to do there.
Although this vision of exclusion applies most naturally to real
property, it can be adapted to personal property as well.37 Valuable
items are often protected through boundary exclusion by virtue of
33. See Smith, supra note 22, at 980-83 (rejecting an understanding of “exclusion” that
would encompass fine-grained restrictions on use and noting the “roughness” of boundary
exclusion as a proxy for harm).
34. See id. at 978-83.
35. See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1362-65.
36. See Smith, supra note 14, at 1756 (observing the greater precision with which
governance operates, relative to exclusion). See generally Smith, supra note 18.
37. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1702-04.
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being placed within the footprint of the owner’s real property
holdings.38 But even when the owner takes these items out into the
world, they are effectively wrapped in a thin membrane of boundary
protection that others are not to breach by touching, moving, or
tampering with these items.39 This imaginary membrane is much
more tightly fitted to match the scope of interfering presences than
in the land case.40 Nonetheless, an owner is perfectly entitled to
keep people from borrowing her goods, even when she is not using
them, and even if she would not notice they had been borrowed.41 In
this way, the exclusion right remains broader than necessary to
directly address interference with the owner’s uses.
B. The Uses of Exclusion
In most economic accounts of property rights, exclusion is instru-
mental—a means to an end. But there are a variety of ends that
exclusion can serve. Additionally, some implications of exclusion
might either be characterized as unintended side effects or con-
sciously pursued as ends in their own right. The Sections below
survey the territory.
38. Similarly, when owners hold, carry, wear, or drive pieces of personal property, back-
ground rights to bodily integrity offer protection against interference or dispossession. For the
idea that rights may “effectively shield” other interests that lack their own protection, see
Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRIES 7, 11-13 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 1998); and Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 604-05, 605 nn.36-37 (2008) (citing Kramer, supra at 12-13 and
discussing this “‘shielding’ thesis”).
39. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to Chattels
and the Anglo-American Doctrinal Divergence, 35 COMMON. L. WORLD REV. 135, 137-44 (2006)
(discussing parallels and divergences between treatment of trespass to land and to chattels).
40. Indeed, not all touchings of personal property will result in liability. See id. at 149-51
(discussing the requirement under American law that there be some form of damage to make
a trespass to chattels actionable).
41. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Illusions About Private Property and Freedom, in IV ISSUES IN
MARXIST PHILOSOPHY: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 223, 236 (John Mepham & David-
Hillel Ruben eds., 1981) (“If A needs tools of a kind which only B has, then, private property
being what it is, he is not free to take B’s one for a while, even if B does not need it during
that while.”).
532 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:521
1. Clearing a Space
At its most essential, exclusion performs a slate-clearing function.
By keeping all but the owner (and her invitees) off the property,
exclusion establishes a zone of noninterference. The value of this
slate-clearing function depends on the things that the owner might
wish to do on, or with, the property. But at the very least, it confers
option value by removing the impediments that the presence of
others might pose to various projects.42 To put the point a little
differently, the space-clearing function of exclusion makes the
property physically available as an input into any activity of con-
sumption or production that an owner might wish to undertake.
Because all activities must be performed somewhere,43 ownership
paired with exclusion rights delivers the owner a broad-spectrum
complement to all manner of endeavors. And because exclusion
clears the space entirely, the owner need not specify in advance
what she might wish to do with the space.44 Although the range of
uses may be narrowed through laws and regulations, an owner’s
background freedom includes all uses that have not been forbidden
to her. By default, ownership confers plenary rather than enumer-
ated powers, encompassing even highly idiosyncratic uses.45 The
owner enjoys this freedom even if she has no desire to exploit her
property’s productive capacity in any ordinary sense.
2. Sowing and Reaping
A primary economic justification for property rights lies in their
capacity to induce optimal investment by allowing people to reap
42. There are other impediments that do not depend on the presence of people on the land,
however, and these are not cleared by boundary exclusion. See infra Part II.A.
43. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295,
296 (1991) (“Everything that is done has to be done somewhere.”).
44. See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 72 (1997) (explaining that his
“exclusion thesis.... characterizes property primarily as a protected sphere of indefinite and
undefined activity”).
45. See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 65 (1996) (including in the potential reach
of ownership’s unspecified prerogatives the freedom “to paint the bedrooms a luminous green,
or to keep coals in the bath, or to inscribe graffiti on the walls, or to breed spiders in the
kitchen”).
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where they have sowed (whether literally or metaphorically).46 It
would be possible to pair the activity of sowing with a right to reap
without making use of boundary exclusion, but this would require
costly monitoring and record-keeping. Simply granting the person
designated as owner a residual claim on the asset itself and keep-
ing everyone else away is often a cheaper and simpler way of accom-
plishing the pairing.47
On this account, exclusion secures the connection between the
owner’s inputs and the outcomes that she enjoys or suffers. But, as
we will see, it does not do so completely. It can only ensure a pairing
of inputs and outcomes to the extent that physical presence on the
property constitutes an adequate proxy for control over the sowing
and reaping operations (or their analogic equivalents). Because
many impacts cross boundaries without being accompanied by a
physical presence, investments can be diluted and augmented by
factors that the individual owner cannot control.48 For example,
nearby development, local amenities such as schools and parks, and
various forms of infrastructure all greatly influence property values
without ever crossing property lines. For this reason, the conclusion
that boundary exclusion is a cheaper and more efficient way to in-
ternalize externalities and reward investment is contingent on the
nature of the relevant externalities and investments.
3. Containing Negative Impacts
Although most discussions of exclusion focus on protecting the
owner’s activities from outside interference, exclusion also helps the
owner avoid interfering with the activities of others. If the owner’s
46. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2083
(2012). See generally Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and
Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903 (1995) (examining connections between property
rights and investments); Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums, 3 J.
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 279 (2005) (examining the effects of property formalization on investment);
Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land
Titling, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 700 (2010) (same).
47. See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 78-80 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing property owners as residual claimants).
48. Owners can, of course, attempt to collectively control these impacts through measures
such as zoning. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001) (ex-
plaining how homeowners use local political power to protect their property values).
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holdings are large enough relative to the sorts of activities she regu-
larly conducts on her land, the impacts of these activities will mostly
be contained within the property’s four corners.49 This is a function
of exclusion. A factory will be less likely to generate troublesome
spillovers if the factory’s owner has surrounded the facility with
buffer land from which she has the right to exclude other uses.
Exclusion is thus a liability-limiting mechanism. Because an essen-
tial ingredient of a nuisance is the presence of people or uses that
are significantly harmed by the activity in question, keeping other
people and uses far away is one strategy for preventing nuisances
from occurring.
One can lump this benefit of exclusion into the category of pro-
tecting a landowner’s investments, once one sees the threat of
liability as a source of interference with the owner’s activities.50
Exclusion is not fail-safe in this regard, however. Trespasses can
occur, and owners are not absolved of liability for all harms that
befall those who are on their property without authorization.51
Further, any owner who cannot afford to buy up enough land to
contain all of her activities’ effects will need to manage her impacts
through other means as well (she might, for example, buy a scrub-
ber for her smokestack). Nonetheless, exclusion is one technique
that owners can and do use to keep their activities from having
negative spillovers on others. And, notably, this is a technique that
relies on exclusion’s overbreadth in time and space.
4. Metering and Monetizing
Exclusion can also keep the positive effects of an owner’s activi-
ties from spilling over onto others—a fact that enables owners to
charge for the benefits their property interests produce. Owners
49. See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1446 (2007)
(noting that the owner’s control of a spatial area lets her find ways “to prevent her own onsite
activities from producing risks that extend beyond the property’s borders”); see also Ellickson,
supra note 16, at 1323-35 (discussing the implications of events of different sizes for the scale
at which property is most efficiently held).
50. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (noting the
reciprocal nature of land use conflicts and the harm caused to a person who is made to stop
doing an activity).
51. See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS 255-61
(2d ed. 2009) (examining duties to trespassers).
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cannot, as a rule, charge their neighbors for benefits that they
gratuitously confer on them.52 But owners can use exclusion to mon-
etize access to those benefits. Thus, an owner can block outsiders
from accessing her property in order to charge them admission.
Here, exclusion disables as well as enables. It deprives people of
desired inputs into their projects and experiences unless they pay
what the owner is asking.
This disabling facet of exclusion should be unsurprising, as it is
merely the flip side of ensuring that owners are able to reap returns
on their investments. Even in a simple case like farming, exclusion
from the cornfields forms the backdrop for market transactions in
corn. Where goods are ordinary commodities like crops, the dis-
abling function of exclusion is unremarkable. It is merely a means
of metering access to resources. The landowner holds no monopoly;
even though her land is unique, there are many substitute sources
of produce. In other cases, however, the owner’s exclusion deprives
a nonowner of a unique input that is not available elsewhere. Here,
the monopoly implications of exclusion become economically
significant—a point to be further developed below.53
The capacity for exclusion to facilitate the metering and monetiz-
ing of resources carries another implication: it can push resource
development toward forms that are more amenable to exclusion.54
Exclusion not only mediates access to resources, then, but also
shapes the way resources are configured. As technological alterna-
tives to exclusion develop, additional ways of packaging and
delivering resources become economically viable.
52. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147,
1157-59 (2006); Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested
Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 195-98 (2009). See generally Saul Levmore, Explaining
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985) (examining the basis for the rule and its various ex-
ceptions).
53. In addition to metering access to resources that an owner’s investments produce,
owners can also meter spatial access to resources that have no ongoing investment activities
underway. For example, an owner might charge entry fees to allow someone to cross an
untended field, or to view a unique geological formation.
54. A contested example involves Nikola Tesla’s efforts to develop wireless electricity in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some accounts suggest that anticipated
difficulties in metering wireless electricity worried would-be backers and caused J.P. Morgan
to withdraw his support. See MARC J. SEIFER, WIZARD: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF NIKOLA TESLA;
BIOGRAPHY OF A GENIUS 300 (1996). But other factors were likely responsible. See W.
BERNARD CARLSON, TESLA: INVENTOR OF THE ELECTRICAL AGE 201-02 (2013).
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5. Territoriality and Coordination
Boundary exclusion also connects to notions of territoriality,
although the strength of the connection and the direction of causa-
tion is unclear. Although definitions vary, the idea of territoriality
is premised on controlling access to resources by controlling the
physical area in which the resources are found.55 Thus territoriality
is premised on the same kind of overbreadth as exclusion rights
generally, insofar as territory defense proxies for resource defense.
Territories need not last forever, but some degree of temporal
continuity seems significant. One study examining the way family
members define their territories within homes found that rooms
used by different family members at different times were deemed
“to belong to all the users.”56 Physical boundedness also seemed to
matter: although asked about portions of rooms, respondents
“defined only [entire] rooms or specific pieces of furniture as terri-
torial areas.”57
Does boundary exclusion foster territoriality, or does it merely
embody preexisting territoriality? Because territoriality is found in
nonhuman animals as well as in human populations,58 it might
seem to be innate. Yet territoriality only develops under conditions
where it provides a competitive advantage.59 Much turns on the
notion of “economic defensibility”: whether the costs of territory
defense are more than repaid by the greater access to resources and
more efficient foraging opportunities that result from restricting
access to the territory.60 An intriguing claim is that this criterion is
55. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cashdan, Territoriality Among Human Foragers: Ecological Models
and an Application to Four Bushman Groups, 24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 47, 47-48 (1983);
Robert D. Sack, Human Territoriality: A Theory, 73 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRA-
PHERS 55, 56, 58 (1983). Notably, some definitions of territoriality do not require exclusivity.
See Cashdan, supra, at 47-48.
56. Rachel Sebba & Arza Churchman, Territories and Territoriality in the Home, 15 ENV’T
& BEHAV. 191, 197-98 (1983) (noting that the kitchen was an exception to this rule, and “was
identified as belonging to the mother”).
57. Id. at 197.
58. See, e.g., id. at 191-92; Cashdan, supra note 55, at 47-48.
59. See, e.g., Cashdan, supra note 55, at 48 (citing Jerram L. Brown, The Evolution of
Diversity in Avian Territorial Systems, 76 WILSON BULL. 160 (1964), as the starting point for
this line of inquiry).
60. See id.
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only met in some ranges of resource scarcity and density.61 Where
resources are plentiful, it is not worth bothering to defend a
territory.62 And where resources are very scarce and widely dis-
persed, the size of the territory that would have to be defended
would be so large as to make this strategy unduly costly.63 Re-
sources that are predictably found in aggregated patches are also
cheaper to defend through territoriality than those that exhibit less
predictability or more mobility or dispersal.64
What this analysis suggests is that boundary exclusion—or what
the anthropological literature terms “perimeter defense”—is a
sustainable strategy under only particular resource conditions.65
Far from being the only or universal way to deal with resources, it
turns out to be contingent. In fact, humans often use a different
form of territoriality, “social boundary defense,” that relies on regu-
lating access to a social group occupying an area rather than to the
area itself.66 This approach breaks the link between territory size
and defense costs that constrains the use of perimeter defense.67 As
this example shows, substitute technologies can stand in for forms
of territoriality that are based on spatial boundaries. In place of
social group membership, new ways of regulating access based on
payments and agreements could take hold.
A remaining question is whether perimeter defense should be
maintained as a social practice in order to foster territoriality itself.
What benefits, if any, might widespread territoriality confer? To the
61. See id.; see also Sack, supra note 55, at 58 (suggesting that territoriality’s effectiveness
as a control strategy is greatest “if the distribution in space and time of the resources or
things to be controlled fall somewhere between ubiquity and unpredictability”).
62. See Cashdan, supra note 55, at 48. This depends on whether there is a natural limit
to how much of the resource anyone can use or store up for later use or resale. See id. at 55.
63. See id. at 48.
64. See, e.g., id.; Sack, supra note 55, at 58-59. See generally D.W. Macdonald & D.D.P.
Johnson, Patchwork Planet: The Resource Dispersion Hypothesis, Society, and the Ecology of
Life, 295 J. ZOOLOGY 75 (2015) (discussing how resource dispersion influences group formation
and defense of territory).
65. See, e.g., Cashdan, supra note 55, at 49.
66. See, e.g., id.; Nicolas Peterson, Hunter-Gatherer Territoriality: The Perspective from
Australia, 77 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 53, 60 (1975) (“An alternative strategy for defending the
land is to make acceptance into the local land using group a preliminary requirement for
using the resources in its territory; that is, by defending the boundaries of the social group
rather than the perimeter of the territory itself.”).
67. See Cashdan, supra note 55, at 54.
538 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:521
extent that territoriality engrains responsibility for the long-term
fate of the area in question, it dovetails with the investment-
encouraging benefits of exclusion. It also provides a focal solution to
disputes over resources by introducing an asymmetry (the posses-
sion of territory) that can form the basis for a convention.68 In this
way, territoriality can facilitate coordination by establishing a prior-
ity of claims over resources.
On the other hand, territoriality can give rise to socially costly
behaviors that make it harder to put resources to good use. For
example, homeowners are often territorial about the curb space
outside their homes and will attempt to keep others from parking
there, even though the homeowners do not always need the space
for their own cars and do not actually own the space.69 Territorial-
ity has also been blamed for worker resistance to “hot desking,” or
floating workstation arrangements, despite the capacity of these
arrangements to save costs and provide other benefits.70
Yet territoriality does not seem to be a hard constraint on flexible
resource alternatives if the owner is permitted to control the terms
of the interaction. For example, community control over curb
parking can be an effective way of putting more parking spaces into
rotation.71 Likewise, what would otherwise seem like an outrageous
intrusion—a stranger occupying one’s bed when one is away—can
be transformed through new transaction structures into an en-
trepreneurial opportunity.72 Although the questions are empirical
68. See, e.g., RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 86-90 (2015);
ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 49-54, 98-107 (2d
ed. 2005); James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 139, 154-55 (2009); see also JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 100
(1992) (“The key in [coordination problem] situations is to discover something in the environ-
ment that will catch the attention of enough actors so that they can establish a common
action, a standard of behavior that will eventually be emulated by the other members of the
community.”); Peter DeScioli & Bart J. Wilson, The Territorial Foundations of Human
Property, 32 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 297, 303 (2011) (finding support in experimental
results for “an ownership convention” that includes willingness of residents “to fight harder
than intruders”).
69. See DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 434 (2005).
70. See, e.g., Graham Brown, Claiming a Corner at Work: Measuring Employee Territori-
ality in Their Workspaces, 29 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 44, 44, 51 (2009); Rachel L. Morrison &
Keith A. Macky, The Demands and Resources Arising from Shared Office Spaces, 60 APPLIED
ERGONOMICS 103, 105 (2017).
71. See SHOUP, supra note 69, at 434-40.
72. See Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 218 (2006)
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ones, these examples suggest that territorial attitudes can yield to
new arrangements if those new arrangements are reached by cer-
tain paths.
6. Expression and Autonomy
The idea that property rights advance liberty interests is a
familiar (if complex and contested) one.73 The ability to set the terms
for interactions over resources can advance autonomy and serve
expressive values. Whether boundary exclusion is essential to these
goals is less clear.74 We might say that freedom of contract, for
example, serves a similar purpose. Nonetheless, there is something
significant about setting aside a bounded domain in which the
owner can pursue her projects and, perhaps equally important, deny
others the ability to pursue theirs over her objections—what
Charles Reich calls “a small but sovereign island of [one’s] own.”75
The ability to deny others access to one’s property can, of course,
mean withholding inputs that are essential to their projects. Unlike
(presenting a thought experiment emphasizing the affront of even an entirely harmless
intrusion—a man taking a nap in one’s bed while one is out, using his own bed linens and
leaving no trace); see also Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 303 (2008) (discussing Ripstein’s example). Temporarily unused bedrooms
are now commonly made available through online interfaces such as Airbnb. One platform
now contemplates people renting out their apartments by the minute to accommodate napping
strangers. See RECHARGE, https://recharge.co/ [https://perma.cc/JM6H-A47Y].
73. On the relationship between property and liberty, see, for example, Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964). For a recent critique of the liberty
justification for property rights protections on the grounds that it neglects the liberty of
nonowners, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 917-29; see
also Cohen, supra note 41, at 227 (describing private property as “a distribution of freedom
and unfreedom”).
74. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Property and Sovereignty: How to Tell the Difference, 18
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 243, 249-52 (2017) (questioning autonomy and use as predicates
for the right to exclude). 
75. Reich, supra note 73, at 774. While Reich takes an expansive view of what constitutes
“property,” his discussion of the connections between liberty and property expressly invokes
the language of boundary exclusion. See id. at 771 (describing property as “draw[ing] a
boundary” or “circle” within which an individual enjoys enhanced freedom and authority, and
“creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner”); D. Benjamin Barros,
Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36, 47 (2009) (describing Reich’s vision of the
relationship between property and liberty as “highly spatialized”); see also Ripstein, supra
note 74, at 249 (articulating one version of property rights as follows: “Your property rights
build a wall around you, providing you with a space within which others must not interfere”).
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an owner who is metering access (or leveraging monopoly power) to
monetize resources, an owner who is using the exclusionary power
expressively might withhold access to communicate disapproval of
the excluded person or her goals,76 to make a point in a longstand-
ing interaction with that individual, or simply to spite the other
party.77 As this list of possibilities suggests, the normative valence
of this power is ambiguous. Moreover, to the extent that liberty or
autonomy is uniquely generated by an exclusion-based form of
ownership, the distribution of that form of ownership also becomes
normatively relevant.
II. IMPACTS AND INTERACTIONS
The attractions of the boundary exclusion model are evident. By
securing temporal continuity and spatial contiguity, a boundary-
ringed vision of property promises to clear space for investment and
grant the owner the flexibility and autonomy to pursue her own
projects over a time horizon of her choosing. But exclusion’s efficacy
in delivering these benefits depends on how social and economic con-
ditions interact with particular resources. Of course, even the most
exclusion-focused property theorists recognize that exclusion cannot
stand alone, and view governance mechanisms as necessary supple-
ments.78 Yet we still must ask whether exclusion continues to serve
as the best starting point. And on that score, there is some reason
for doubt.
The increased interdependence among properties that has
accompanied widespread urbanization raises questions about two
76. See James Y. Stern, What Is the Right to Exclude and Why Does It Matter?, in PROP-
ERTY THEORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 38, 66-67 (James Penner & Michael
Otsuka eds., 2018) (giving the example of an owner who wants to deny a group of neo-Nazis
access to his land for one of their rallies, not because he wishes to use the property himself,
but because he does not want to let them use it).
77. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Owning Bad: Leverage and Spite in Property Law, in
CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds.,
(forthcoming)), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3262836 [https://perma.cc/
D4T7-ZHZG]; Jeffrey Harrison, Spite: Legal and Social Implications, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 991 (2018); Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of
Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444 (2013).
78. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 14, at 1755-57 (noting advantages of governance when
precision is required).
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central features of an exclusion-centric model of real property:
boundary defense as a proxy for resource defense, and the capacity
of owners to monopolize unique resources. The first of these features
suggests why boundary exclusion has become less useful, while the
second explains why it has become more socially costly.
A. A Weakening Proxy
Exclusion promises to protect the owner’s property-related en-
deavors from interference so that her projects can flourish and
grow.79 The owner may pick bad projects, and exclusion will not turn
them into good ones nor save her from their negative consequences.
But if she succeeds in building something valuable, exclusion will
enable her to reap the rewards.80 And indeed, exclusion works fairly
well as a proxy for resource protection when we think of agrarian
examples such as crops and herds. Here, physical intrusion spells
interference, and a lack of intrusion corresponds to noninterference.
The law supplements exclusion with governance measures such as
nuisance law, but exclusion offers a good first line of defense.81
The correspondence between exclusion and noninterference is not
inevitable, however. It depends on whether physical exclusion from
boundaries is a good proxy for keeping out bad effects that would
spoil an owner’s investments and for protecting her ability to enjoy
(or sell, or gift) the fruits of her labors. The proxy value of physical
exclusion is not equally robust across all contexts, and it is subject
to change as social and economic conditions evolve. With increasing
urbanization, exclusion has become a less useful mechanism for
safeguarding property’s value.
Many of the largest modern threats to real property have nothing
to do with boundary crossings. Instead, property values are today
largely a function of proximity to other valuable uses and ame-
nities.82 Of course, exclusion is just one technology for managing
access to resources; it is augmented by an array of land use controls,
79. See supra Part I.
80. See Demsetz, supra note 3, at 356.
81. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 1709-10.
82. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1373, 1383.
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including zoning and private covenants.83 However, these forms of
governance typically operate in rather boundary-focused ways.
Because these controls are principally about excluding uses, they
rely on the same failing proxy, albeit at a larger scale. Through land
use controls such as zoning and covenants, the circle of control
expands outward to categorically exclude certain kinds of uses.84
Just as boundary exclusion is overinclusive and underinclusive at
the parcel level,85 these controls are likely to overexclude uses that
would be benign or even beneficial, fail to keep out uses that
subtract value from the area, or both.
Although such forms of governance have evolved to address new
challenges, they still mesh poorly with prevalent features of urban
life.86 The problem is not only that nearby uses could cause one’s
property values to fall, but also that they could keep property values
from rising. While land use controls are set up to keep out incompat-
ible uses, they are not well suited to maximize urban agglomeration
benefits, which are of growing economic importance.87 If one is inter-
ested in making the most of real property in an urban environment,
creating positive synergies with one’s neighbors is as important as
keeping conflicting uses away.
A primary threat to land’s value as a resource is, in short, a
failure of complementarity. Boundary exclusion cannot effectively
group together the elements that will generate the most value in
combination. Nor can land use controls, at least as currently consti-
tuted. Existing land use controls do try to reach out beyond the
boundaries of the individual parcel to secure inputs that are comple-
mentary to the owner’s enterprises. Suppose that a certain degree
of quiet and serenity beyond the edges of one’s home is strongly
83. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 14, at 3.
84. See, e.g., id. at 23-24, 55-56.
85. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22, at 982-83.
86. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 82, at 1406-07.
87. For legal scholarship addressing agglomeration benefits, see, for example, id.; Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 211 (2012); David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1507 (2010). A large body of economic literature has developed on this topic. An early
influence was ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IV.X.7-13 § 3 (8th ed. 1920). For
a taxonomy and analysis of agglomeration benefits, see generally Gilles Duranton & Diego
Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL
AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2063 (J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques-François Thisse eds., 2004).
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complementary to the enterprise of “residential living.” An owner
could secure that complement by buying a large lot with plenty of
buffer space around the home, or she could secure it through the
operation of a land use control that limits what her neighbors can
do and thereby effectively forces them to provide that input
(typically in exchange for her reciprocal restraint). But what if the
input that she really needs to enjoy her home is not peace and quiet
but higher density development in the area or successful retail
stores nearby that would enliven the urban experience? Land use
controls that focus on keeping things out cannot secure this kind of
input.
These points do not suggest that boundary exclusion is unneces-
sary, only that it is insufficient to deliver what property owners
want. In real property contexts, exclusion at the parcel level serves
a variety of significant purposes, including protecting privacy and
seclusion, securing personal property that is stored on the premises,
and offering a staging ground for ongoing projects—whether a new
invention, an interrupted chess game, or a craft project. Yet some of
these functions require less continuity and contiguity than a bound-
ary exclusion model would suggest. For example, privacy and peace
can be supplied outside of the home on an à la carte basis through
sleeping pods or hotels (which are now even available by the min-
ute).88 Storage facilities and shared “makerspaces” can offer a place
to hold one’s goods and one’s works in progress.89 Homes and offices
can be made more portable and flexible through new interfaces that
supply on-demand residential and workplace services.90
Personal property too is undergoing change. While the dominant
model for many forms of personal property still involves keeping
others away, some items such as computers are becoming more or
less interchangeable portals for accessing content that resides else-
where. Owning the same machine over time becomes less important
than having the right kinds of interactivity with software, apps, and
88. See, e.g., RECHARGE, supra note 72.
89. See, e.g., What is a Makerspace?, MAKERSPACES, https://www.makerspaces.com/what-
is-a-makerspace/ [https://perma.cc/Q26X-KBXL].
90. See, e.g., Workspace, WEWORK, https://www.wework.com/workspace [https://perma.cc/
4UPB-JUC7] (offering short-term private and shared workspaces); WELIVE, https://www.
welive.com [https://perma.cc/97NQ-PZWG] (offering furnished housing for shorter and longer
term use).
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other users.91 Threats to value now come more from obsolescence
and incompatibilities than from physical intrusions. These threats
do not make exclusion unimportant, but they do make it incomplete.
Whether exclusion will remain relevant as other threats to asset
value rise is an open question. The techniques that are developed to
address other losses in value could also change the modality of
resource access from one that is premised on exclusion. Thus, hard-
ware tracking mechanisms and rapid replacement might be
supplied along with 24/7 repairs and continual updates, supplanting
the need for owner vigilance.
Specifics vary from context to context, but the trend is a general
one: the proxy value of exclusion is weakening. Boundary exclusion
has become less effective in safeguarding and maximizing asset
value. It has also become a more socially costly strategy owing to a
feature inherent in its design: the monopoly power that it grants to
owners. The next Section explains.
B. More Costly Monopolies
Ownership backed by exclusion keeps nonowners from accessing
resources without the owner’s consent, even when those resources
represent crucial inputs into socially valuable projects.92 This im-
plication of exclusion becomes significant when the owner holds
monopoly power over the input in question. Complementarities be-
tween separately owned properties can go unrealized due to the veto
power each owner enjoys over their aggregation.
Consider land holdings. Because every piece of real estate
occupies a unique spatial position, owners are always monopolists
over the particular locations that they own.93 But this nominal
monopoly need not translate into any meaningful market power.
Often sites are fungible and many good substitutes exist.94 The
91. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 515, 548-51 (2013) (discussing network effects that depend on interoperability).
92. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75-
77 (1986) (discussing owners’ monopoly power in land assembly and other “thin market”
contexts).
93. See Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and
Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 107 (2005).
94. See, e.g., id. at 108-09 (explaining how spatial monopolies over plots of land are
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spatial uniqueness of land becomes relevant when it is an essential
input into a larger project, such as the assembly of land for a high-
way or redevelopment project.95 It also becomes significant when an
issue arises between neighbors about impacts or access specific to
their positions relative to each other, since they have no choice but
to deal with each other.96
Personal property can also, if less commonly, confer monopoly
power. Most goods are fungible and readily available on open
markets. Of course there are some unique goods—custom cars,
hand-designed jewelry, artwork, and the like—for which close sub-
stitutes do not exist. More commonly, goods that are initially
fungible become unique to a particular owner because of associa-
tions and experiences that infuse the good with subjective value.
This uniqueness confers relevant monopoly power only if the high
valuer is not also the current owner—if, say, one person’s cherished
heirloom has somehow fallen into the hands of another.97 Monopoly
leverage also becomes meaningful when a particular item serves as
a crucial input into a larger assembly, such as a collection of art-
work representing a particular period, school, style, or phase of an
artist’s career.98
Situations in which owners of unique goods wield significant
monopoly power can be recast in terms of complementarities.
constrained by competition).
95. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 92, at 75.
96. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW 19-20 (2005).
97. Put another way, personal property that an owner has customized or has become
attached to through long possession and use is unlikely to represent a crucial input into the
projects of other people. For example, a wedding ring may be valued as a unique and irre-
placeable good by the person whose relationship it represents, but almost anyone else would
view it as fungible with physically similar rings. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-60 (1982) (using the example of wedding rings to
distinguish “personal property” from “fungible property”).
98. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394
(1978) (describing as “polycentric” the task of dividing a set of paintings between two art
museums because “the disposition of any single painting has implications for the proper
disposition of every other painting”). Related issues arise regarding the siting and curation
of items of cultural significance, which can implicate (among other concerns) competing
complementarities. See, e.g., Jim Leitzel, The Parthenon Marbles in the British Museum 11-
12 (July 2, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2803930 [https://
perma.cc/9AGZ-2983] (discussing the advantages of viewing the Parthenon Marbles in
proximity to the Parthenon versus in proximity to other cultural treasures in the British
Museum).
546 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:521
Assembly surplus for land, like anticommons analysis more gen-
erally, is premised on a set of entitlements gaining value when put
together.99 The potential leverage of any one party in these contexts
depends on the degree of complementarity among the elements to
be assembled—whether plots of land, pieces of artwork, or slices of
radio spectra.100 Complementarity also features heavily in disputes
between neighbors that present bilateral monopoly dynamics. For
example, a landlocked parcel and the access rights necessary to
reach it are perfect complements—each is useless without the other.
Likewise, the portion of a wall that was accidentally built over the
owner’s property line complements the rest of that wall and the
structure that it supports. Pieces of real and personal property can
also be complementary to the special skills, interests, or sentiments
of particular individuals. For example, a brickmaker’s skill comple-
ments land that contains brick-making clay, and a descendant’s
personal history and memories make a family heirloom more valu-
able in her hands than in those of a stranger.
Complementarity is important to emphasize for two reasons.
First, the degree to which entitlements are complementary to each
other is contingent on prevailing social and economic conditions.
This point is tightly connected to the idea of efficient scale, which
can vary over time depending on the types of resources that are
most economically important and on the societal arrangements sur-
rounding those resources. New economies of scale and diseconomies
of scale require property holdings to be reconfigured over time.101
The difficulty of a given reconfiguration depends not only on who
holds the necessary entitlements, but also on the constraints—on
contiguity, shape, and location (both absolute and relative to other
land uses)—that define the relevant complementarities.102 Both the
99. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 640 (1998) (discussing difficulties
in assembling rights “into usable bundles”).
100. See generally Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Holdout in the Assembly of
Complements: A Problem for Market Design, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 360 (2012).
101. On problems of optimal scale, see, for example, Lee Anne Fennell, Commons,
Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW
35, 48 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2008); and
Demsetz, supra note 3, at 357-58.
102. See Kominers & Weyl, supra note 100, at 362-63 & nn.13-14 (discussing variations in
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need for reconfiguration and the constraints upon it have increased
with greater urbanization.103 More value can be gained by putting
together complementary land uses, but doing so becomes harder to
the extent that the components are already separately owned. The
monopoly power that owners hold has accordingly become more eco-
nomically significant, which increases the costs associated with the
exclusion strategy and the veto power it gives owners.
A second reason to emphasize complementarity relates to the
nature of the costs imposed by monopolistic owners of unique
resources. In textbook monopoly situations, a sole supplier limits
output of a good and raises its price, generating a deadweight
loss.104 When a property owner holds monopoly power over a unique
good or entitlement that is essential to the value or usefulness of
someone else’s projects or holdings, there is only one unit of the good
in the picture; it will or will not be transferred at some price. In this
context, losses to efficiency take two forms: (1) a loss in allocative
efficiency if a transfer does not take place that should take place;
and (2) a loss of time, money, and effort associated with wrangling
over the division of surplus in the course of determining whether the
deal will or will not occur.105
The magnitude of these costs depends on how much more valu-
able the assembled set of entitlements is relative to the sum of the
individual pieces, and on other features of the situation that deter-
mine the bargaining costs and dynamics. Given the modern
significance of urban agglomerations to the value of real property,
it is a reasonable surmise that the gap in value between assembled
and unassembled entitlements is growing.106 And while technology
has greatly reduced the costs of carrying out transactions in
assembly problems and noting the relevance of contiguity requirements).
103. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1461-62
(2016).
104. See, e.g., AUSTAN GOOLSBEE ET AL., MICROECONOMICS 331, 358 (2d ed., 2016).
105. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics
of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1092 & n.37 (1980).
106. Recent empirical work has examined the premiums paid for parcels that were destined
for assembly, in an effort to identify land use frictions. See Leah Brooks & Byron Lutz, From
Today’s City to Tomorrow’s City: An Empirical Investigation of Urban Land Assembly, 8 AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 69, 71-72 (2016); Chris Cunningham, Estimating the Holdout Problem
in Land Assembly 1-2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2013-19, 2013), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579904 [https://perma.cc/F525-S73K].
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competitive settings where prices are not subject to haggling, the
problem of how to divide the surplus in bilateral monopoly situa-
tions continues to loom large.107 However, any source of substitution
greatly eases bargaining dynamics by introducing competition and
loosening the degree of complementarity among particular entitle-
ments.108 For example, if it is only necessary to assemble eight out
of ten parcels in a given area, no owner can act as a holdout, and
any owner who tries may find herself out of a bargain that would
have made her better off. Although it is an empirical question, the
spatial sensitivity of many would-be assemblies in urban areas has
likely reduced the availability of substitutes and made comple-
mentarities increasingly strict.
The basic claim, then, is that as complementarities between
separately owned elements tighten, the capacity of each owner to
monopolize an element of a complementary set grows, increasing
social costs. There are many ways that these costs might be ad-
dressed. Most obviously, the property rule protection that gives
owners a veto power could be replaced with a liability rule, as
already occurs with eminent domain.109 Eric Posner and Glen Weyl
contemplate a massive expansion of this move, coupled with self-
assessed valuation (and associated taxation) to address the monop-
oly problems baked into current property arrangements.110 Many
other proposals have attempted to surmount holdout problems
through mechanisms that alter owners’ property rights.111 But all
107. For related distinctions among types of transaction costs, see, for example, Lee Anne
Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1485-87, 1510-15 (2013);
Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs, 27 ORG. STUD. 1389,
1389-90 (2006); and Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184
(1997).
108. See, e.g., Kominers & Weyl, supra note 100, at 362-63; Abel M. Winn & Matthew W.
McCarter, Who’s Holding Out? An Experimental Study of the Benefits and Burdens of Eminent
Domain, 105 J. URB. ECON. 176, 184-85 (2018).
109. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (defining and
distinguishing property rules and liability rules).
110. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 30-79 (2018). See generally Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl,
Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 51 (2017).
111. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1465, 1488-97 (2008); Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1704, 1731-48 (2007); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation
Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 890-900 (2007).
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such solutions must confront another important fact about modern
property rights: there is frequently more than one complementarity
in the picture.
We see competing complementarities play out in eminent domain
when a close-knit neighborhood is broken up through displacement
in order to redevelop an area or put in a highway.112 We see tempo-
ral complementarities disrupted when longtime residents are forced
to move from homes and communities to which they have devel-
oped strong attachments.113 And partial takings can break up
complementarities within property holdings, making the balance
dramatically less valuable.114 Boundary exclusion supports the
maintenance of many such complementarities by allowing the owner
to deflect attempted involuntary acquisitions. Yet at the same time,
other complementary bundles are impeded or left vulnerable by an
exclusion-based model.
One might suggest at this point that the problem is not with the
boundary exclusion model as such, but rather with where the
boundary lines are drawn. Perhaps some urban land holdings are
uneconomically small, for example, and should simply be made
larger.115 A similar intuition crops up in work on the theory of the
firm, where ownership of complementary assets prevents hold-up
problems from developing.116 If broken complementarities produce
costly monopolies, why not just expand the circle of ownership?
Consolidating larger blocks of ownership in fewer hands is indeed
a potential strategy for managing complementarities,117 but it
112. The costs of severing communities—both internally and from nearby amenities and
services—is examined in, for example, José M. Grisolía et al., Burying the Highway: The
Social Valuation of Community Severance and Amenity, 9 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE TRANSP. 298
(2015).
113. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1971-72 (2012).
114. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Partial Takings, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2043,
2045, 2062-66 (2017).
115. Cf. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST 170, 231 n.33
(2004) (observing that certain Homestead Act claims were of insufficient size, given the land’s
characteristics).
116. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
117. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 87, at 247-57.
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introduces internal management challenges as well as questions
about overly concentrated ownership.118 And it may be unnecessary.
The complementarities to which exclusion’s monopoly power
poses a threat are ones that could be achieved through unified
ownership of all the pieces. But complementary parts can work
together to produce value even if separately owned, so long as co-
ordination is possible.119 Moreover, sometimes the relevant comple-
mentarity is not between entire properties but certain pieces of each
one. Commercial air travel through what owners might have
thought were their own personal columns of air is the classic
example.120 A boundary exclusion model lends itself to thinking
about ownership and nonownership in whole-property units. Yet it
has always been possible to break up unified blocks of ownership
into separately owned components, both in time and space, and it
has become increasingly worthwhile to do so. This brings us to the
flip side of boundary exclusion’s waning relevance: the diminishing
complementarity found within pieces of real and personal property.
III. FROM LUMPS TO SLICES
Exclusion’s value as a strategy depends on the capacity of bound-
aries to group together elements that, in combination, generate
value. The discussion in Part II emphasized ways that boundaries
fail to capture extraparcel impacts and interactions. But can we at
least say that, however underinclusive they may be, boundaries do
manage to mark out chunks of ownership that are internally
complementary, both spatially and temporally? Not necessarily.
Although this remains true for some resources, for others enduring
lumps of ownership are giving way to slices of access on demand.
Alternatives to full-strength ownership are emerging: new modes
of access do away with the continuity in possession that accompa-
nies traditional boundary exclusion, and can also alter the physical
118.  See, e.g., Coase, supra note 16, at 394-95 (noting the costs of carrying out transactions
within a firm); Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2094
(2012) (noting the disadvantages of concentrated ownership).
119. See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351-53 (1991). 
120. For a thorough history of the overflight issue and its resolution, see generally STUART
BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT
BROTHERS ON (2008).
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scope of ownership. For example, it becomes less necessary to choose
a home with space for infrequent houseguests if it is easy to find
spare bedrooms right in the neighborhood on an as-needed basis.
The costs of small-scale transactions over slices of access have fallen
dramatically, making outright ownership of many goods unneces-
sary. At the same time, the burdens of constant possession have
grown as space has become more scarce and as the opportunity costs
associated with untapped excess capacity have increased. Put
another way, the boundary exclusion model assumes that there are
temporal economies of scale, with longer periods of possession pro-
ducing disproportionately greater value. But diseconomies of scale
are now emerging in the dimension of time: shorter, scattered stints
of possession often generate more value in total than persistent
possession of a thing by a single owner.
To be clear, this shift is not uniformly occurring in all domains—
nor should it. The discussion below will consider some limits on the
disaggregation of the ownership experience. But it is important to
consider this trend alongside the greater interdependence among
holdings discussed in the previous Part. Doing so shows us that
property’s exclusion-based model is under pressure from two
directions, not just one. At the same time as interdependence among
properties is growing, within-property interdependence is breaking
down in interesting ways. That these trends have appeared together
is not a coincidence. The same processes of urbanization that gen-
erate interdependencies among properties also facilitate the thick
markets that can support new ways of slicing up interests in
property.121
A. Ownership and Overbreadth
A boundary exclusion strategy, as I emphasized at the outset, is
prophylactic. By parceling out rights in lumpy, thing-shaped
servings, ownership builds in overbreadth.122 Physical contiguity
and temporal continuity together secure blocks of potential use that
are greater than a typical owner can personally consume. Likewise,
121. See Davidson & Infranca, supra note 4, at 220.
122. On the lumpiness of property rights, see, for example, Fennell, supra note 113, at
1962-64; Smith, supra note 2, at 1693.
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the investments the owner undertakes on or with her property do
not generally depend on a strong right to exclude others from every
square inch, around the clock, every day of the year. In short,
boundary-focused property characteristically gives people more
rights than they need or can use.
The result is excess capacity: unused benefit streams sequestered
within owned resources. This underutilization does not necessarily
signal inefficiency. Policing boundaries might be so much cheaper
than making moment-by-moment judgments about claims over re-
sources that it makes no sense to worry about excess capacity when
defining property rights.123 Moreover, excess capacity only persists
to the extent that the owner does not transfer it to others through
market transactions or sharing arrangements. A boundary exclusion
model puts the owner in charge of those transactions and leaves it
up to her to decide whether they are worth carrying out, or whether
it is instead more advantageous to simply tolerate the excess capac-
ity. There are costs and benefits on both sides of the ledger.
Although slack capacity sounds wasteful, it carries considerable
benefits for owners, including the option of using the property when-
ever the owner wishes.124 A toaster or washing machine may go
unused for days at a time, but it stands ready whenever the owner
wishes to make use of it. Similarly, unneeded capacity can be
spontaneously gifted. For example, a spare bedroom can accommo-
date an unexpected out-of-town guest or family member in need of
a place to stay. Not making deals over every fragment of unused
property preserves flexibility even as it avoids the costs of transact-
ing.
Unused capacity carries downsides, however. People cannot ac-
quire assets at all if full-time ownership of the thing is too expensive
and it is too cumbersome or costly to set up a sharing or fractional
123. See Demsetz, supra note 3, at 350-52 (observing that the costs of delineating and
enforcing property rights will not always be worth incurring); Ellickson, supra note 16, at
1327-28 (“Monitoring boundary crossings is easier than monitoring the behavior of persons
situated inside boundaries.”).
124. I thank Scott Baker for emphasizing this dimension of value. For a discussion of option
value in the context of collective goods, see Burton A. Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption
Services of Individual-Consumption Goods, 78 Q.J. ECON. 471, 472-73 (1964). Like a public
park that offers the option of use to many who never make actual use of it, a privately owned
good that is continually possessed stands available for use by all temporal selves, no matter
how many or few of them actually exercise the option to use it.
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ownership arrangement.125 If an owner’s demand for a resource
fluctuates over time, she must choose between episodic inadequacy
or persistent surplus. For example, a car that is used for daily
commuting and occasional family outings might be optimally sized
for either the former or the latter, or for something in between, with
concomitant shortages or excesses of space. As this example
suggests, the carrying costs of excess capacity, such as extra fuel
consumption, can be significant. Relatedly, owning something all
the time means having to store it whenever it is not in use.
Some of these costs and benefits are changing as a function of
social and technological developments. Most obviously, technology
is offering new platforms for tapping into excess capacity through
business models such as Airbnb and Uber. Urbanization helps sus-
tain thick markets in which these models can thrive,126 even as it
sharpens some of the costs of constant possession by making space
more expensive to consume. Technology is thus offering new ways
to tap into—and relieve oneself of—excess capacity. Yet it is doing
so from a starting point of boundary exclusion. This trend might
make us question whether excess capacity should be classed as a
problem with boundary exclusion, rather than merely an opportu-
nity that it presents.
In fact, we are likely observing a transitional phase in resource
use. As it becomes increasingly attractive for people to access
certain kinds of resources on demand, full-strength ownership of
those assets will presumably become less popular.127 We would
expect to see ownership concentrated among those who are especial-
ly well-suited to manage assets, and who are in a good position to
bring those goods to market in readily accessible slices (or to form
contracts with intermediaries who will do so on their behalf).128 As
this process unfolds, ordinary consumers may own fewer assets that
125. See, e.g., PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, THE COMMON SENSE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 99-100,
108-09 (1910) (presenting examples illustrating this point).
126. See Davidson & Infranca, supra note 4, at 219-21.
127. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 108-09 (2016).
128. This conclusion depends on some parties having lower costs than others to bring newly
subdivided goods to market, whether due to economies of scale, expertise, or other factors. See
John J. Horton & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Owning, Using and Renting: Some Simple
Economics of the “Sharing Economy” 19-20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.
22029, 2016).
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come with excess capacity, and thus less frequently wind up with
leftovers to share.129 Although platform economies are making en-
trepreneurs and hoteliers out of millions of regular folks, only those
who are really good at the job of managing transactions are likely
to keep at it for long, once they have the option of simply accessing
their own on-demand streams of resources.
We are moving into a new slicing economy—a world in which a
great deal of innovation surrounds the process of dividing up prod-
ucts and services to form “right-sized” benefit streams.130 Just as it
is not practical for most people to own their own cows to secure
access to milk, it increasingly will not make sense for most people
to own the means of producing transportation services—or perhaps
in the foreseeable future, the means of producing residential ser-
vices. To the extent that new models represent better ways of
making use of existing capacity, the potential for significant gains
exists. Value that is now trapped inside owned resources can be
tapped more affordably on an as-needed basis.
To be sure, exclusion will continue to lie behind these arrange-
ments. Someone has to own the loaf (and be able to keep others from
using it), even if most people are just buying slices as they need
them. But this “pre-slicing” exclusion will have different implica-
tions than boundary exclusion as we know it today. It will not be
designed to deliver use value to possessors, but rather exchange
value to those in charge of slicing up access.131 Exclusion will, in
129. In other words, consumers might purchase fewer goods of “mid-grained” granularity,
which come with shareable excess capacity. See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable
Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J.
273, 276-77, 297 (2004) (presenting a taxonomy of granularity). On-demand access in which
consumers buy just what they need, when they need it, involves finer granularity and does
not leave extra capacity to sell or give away. See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and
Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1952 (2014) (observing
that “[w]ith small-grained goods, you tend to buy only as much as you need, so you are
unlikely to have shareable leftovers”).
130. ROBIN CHASE, PEERS INC 44 (2015) (observing that platforms capable of “slicing” and
“aggregating” can “create a right-sized asset”); see also UMAIR HAQUE, THE NEW CAPITALIST
MANIFESTO 128-31, 137 (2011) (discussing how new business models engage in “micro-
chunking”—making products and services available in smaller increments).
131. The distinction between “use-value” and “exchange value” appears in KARL MARX,
CAPITAL 2-8 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., George Allen &
Unwin Ltd. 4th ed. 1971) (1889). For use of this distinction in property theory, see, for exam-
ple, JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PLACE 1-2 (20th anniversary ed. 2007); and Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL
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other words, become a raw material for production rather than an
attribute for direct consumption by end users. Any excess capacity
that remains will be regarded not as foundational to the architec-
ture of property, but rather as a form of industrial waste that exists
only because the technology is not yet good enough to wring value
out of every scrap.
This point should not be overstated. Asset ownership and asso-
ciated exclusion will probably always make sense for certain kinds
of goods. Moreover, excess capacity offers some unremarked bene-
fits, including the flexibility to meet unexpected needs. Well-
developed on-demand models can restore that flexibility in a
different form: a person who cannot loan a car to a friend can call a
ridesharing service for her, for example. Difficulties may arise,
however, in the transitional period when people have ceded the
flexibility that is bundled with traditional asset ownership without
fully built-out alternative sources of flexibility. And there are many
categories of assets that at least some people will wish to continue
owning outright, for a variety of reasons, long after on-demand
alternatives become widespread and seamless. But exclusion’s rele-
vance to the everyday experience of resource use is likely to be
waning.
B. Pinpointing Gains, Recognizing Costs
Although we are seeing a flurry of experimentation in various
platform-enabled access arrangements, not all of them will prove
viable over time. Without question, the costs of carrying out small-
scale transactions have dropped dramatically, which opens up the
possibility of resource arrangements that were previously too expen-
sive to contemplate. But before we reach the question of whether
these “bringing-to-market costs”132 are worth bearing, a more foun-
dational question must be addressed: whether the potential gains
of the new resource arrangement exceed the costs of jettisoning the
continuity and contiguity of full ownership. Sometimes this will
L. REV. 821, 834-36 (2009).
132. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 128, at 3-4 (using the term “bringing-to-market
costs” to encompass labor, transaction, and other costs associated with peer-to-peer rental of
excess capacity).
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simply not be the case, even for assets that might seem under-
utilized.
1. Efficiently Underused?
Commentators often cite the proportion of time that a given asset
sits idle as prima facie evidence, if not conclusive proof, that it is
being wastefully employed. For example, Jeremy Rifkin laments
that “[t]he average vehicle in the United States is idle 92 percent of
the time, making it an extremely inefficient fixed asset.”133 Yet
“percent of time idle” is an utterly unreliable metric for identifying
opportunities for gains from resource reconfiguration. This is ob-
vious in the case of rarely used but contingently essential items
such as fire extinguishers, but the critique applies as well to a va-
riety of more mundane items.
Think of a toothbrush. A person who brushes her teeth for two
minutes twice per day will leave her toothbrush sitting idle for
about 23.93 hours out of each 24-hour period, or about 99.7 percent
of the time. Suppose there were a sharing service capable of whisk-
ing a toothbrush from person to person by drone, instantaneously
sterilizing it en route, so that a given toothbrush could be used
continuously throughout each 24-hour period. Would this herald in
a brave new era of toothbrushing hyperefficiency? Of course not.
Toothbrushes wear out as a function of brushing teeth. So a tooth-
brush shared among dozens of people each day will wear out dozens
of times faster, requiring roughly the same number of toothbrushes
to be used population-wide over time as before, only far less con-
veniently. Even if setting up a sharing service were costless, it
would be worse than pointless.134
This conclusion turns on some key facts about toothbrushes,
including the fact that use, rather than the mere passage of time,
wears them out. Toothbrushes are easy to store and transport, do
not require a large outlay of cash up front, and are relatively
immune to design changes that would render them obsolete or
133. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE
COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 228 (2014).
134. Horton and Zeckhauser note that the shortness of use sessions for toothbrushes cut
against their suitability as a rental item. See Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 128, at 22.
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unstylish during their normal life cycle. Moreover, much of their
value comes from having the option to use them whenever one
wishes (that is, choosing which four minutes one will spend brush-
ing one’s teeth). Continuity of ownership might not be strictly
necessary to deliver the benefits of the toothbrush, but it is hard to
imagine any sharing or rental system that could dominate asset
ownership for such an item.135
Not everything is as good a candidate for outright ownership as
a toothbrush, but it remains important to specify the ways in which
a more thinly sliced approach to resource access could generate
savings. Consider another example commentators have focused on:
the lawnmower.136 Lawnmowers, like cars and toothbrushes, spend
most of their time just sitting around. Could a group of neighbors
enjoy gains by sharing one? The answer depends in part on what
causes lawnmowers to wear out. Is it the number of lawn-acres cut,
the passage of time, the effects of sitting idle (rust, clogged fuel
lines), technical obsolescence, or some of each? If grass cutting alone
is what wears out lawnmowers, then the situation looks a bit like
the toothbrush case. On this assumption, ten households sharing
one lawnmower will burn through the same number of machines in
the same period of time as if they owned their own machines—
assuming, perhaps counterfactually, that the inconvenience of the
sharing arrangement does not cause them to curtail their mowing
practices.
However, the sharing arrangement could be useful in other ways.
For one thing, it could economize on storage if space is at a pre-
mium, since the machines would be owned sequentially rather than
concurrently. For another, the households could take advantage of
technological advancements as their shared use shortens the life
cycle of each machine. Having all households pitch in on one ma-
chine at a time can also address liquidity shortfalls and serve as a
pocketbook-friendly alternative to financing the purchase. Perhaps
the neighbors would enjoy intangible benefits of thrifty solidarity or
135. See Cohen, supra note 41, at 236 (“There is little sense in one hundred people sharing
control over one hundred toothbrushes.”).
136. See, e.g., Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy, 43
PEPP. L. REV. 61, 83 (2015) (quoting a video from NeighborGoods that asks “does everyone on
your block need to own a lawnmower?”).
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sociability. At the same time, correlated demand for the machine
could be a problem—everyone is likely to want to mow the yard on
weekend days with good weather. For similar reasons, snow shovel
sharing might be a nonstarter. The option value of constant
availability that featured prominently in the toothbrush case may
reemerge here.
For each of the many goods and services that seem poised to move
to on-demand access, we must ask a similar set of questions. In
some cases, continuity of access offers real benefits, while in others
the stream of benefits can be just as easily provided through an on-
demand model, without outright asset ownership. The next Sections
elaborate on two implications of making ownership less continuous:
tradeoffs between familiarity and variety, and the possibility that
a less continuous ownership experience will enable people to offload
costs onto others.
2. Familiarity and Variety
Property, in exclusion mode, bundles together possession over
lengthy, unbroken stretches of time. The implicit assumption is that
there are temporal economies of scale, so that ownership across a
long span of time generates more value than would the sum of dis-
aggregated time slices of possession. Even if property sits idle much
of the time, it may still be more valuable in one person’s hands than
if it were constantly passed around from user to user.
One reason is the familiarity and experience that an owner gains
with a particular possession. Someone who rides the same bicycle
or operates the same coffeemaker over a span of time learns its
special quirks, finds ways to overcome its shortfalls, and can adjust
all of its settings to fit her preferences with no need for readjust-
ment. The owner interacts with the thing and adapts it to suit her
particular needs and purposes, perhaps even adorning it with
personal touches. Sentimental attachments may form as well,
though this need not occur in order for temporal economies of scale
to exist—it is enough that there are gains from having the same
object day to day, even if those gains are practical rather than
emotional.
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These points carry special force when it comes to real property—
especially residential real property. An individual or household
gains experience not only with the physical structure itself, but also
with its location relative to other amenities and services in the
vicinity. A life is built up around the home, and to switch homes
would disrupt far more than one’s interactions with the residence
itself. Some of the reasons may be quite personal in nature, but
many are simply practical: knowing where to get the best deals on
groceries, perfecting the commuting route, or finding one’s regular
coffee shops, fitness classes, and dry cleaners. As these examples
suggest, technology now massively speeds up the learning process
along many of these dimensions, but some forms of familiarity come
only with experience.
Diseconomies of temporal scale—situations in which more total
value can be wrung from a resource if it is subdivided over time
among users—are also fully possible. Similarly, there can be dis-
economies of physical scale, so that a tract of land renders more
value if subdivided into multiple parcels rather than maintained
intact. Both temporal and spatial diseconomies of scale have been
largely ignored by property scholars, presumably because of the way
property ownership is typically structured. If someone owns a larger
parcel of land than she needs, she simply sells part of it. Likewise,
she does not have to hold onto property for longer than serves her
needs; she can lease or sell it at any time. The advent of platforms
that make subdividing in time and space increasingly seamless
would seem to further reduce concerns about these diseconomies.
Still, regulatory barriers can block efforts to divide interests in time
and space, making these diseconomies relevant to policy. Identify-
ing the sources of these diseconomies also becomes important
analytically as we consider new forms of ownership.
An asset held over time can become obsolete or boring, or it can
fall out of alignment (temporarily or permanently) with one’s needs.
Conversely, slicing up goods in time can enable people to experience
a greater variety of goods.137 Many acquisitions, whether of cars,
houses, or winter coats, require the purchaser to consider the full
span of conditions under which use will occur and assess how well
137. See Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 128, at 32 (noting the ability to diversify across
types of blenders or cars with shorter-term use arrangements).
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particular features will accommodate those fluctuations. The coat
that is warm enough for the coldest days of the year may be
unsuitable on other days, and the vehicle that works well for car-
pooling kids to soccer practice or hauling lumber home for a ren-
ovation project may lack the sportiness and fuel efficiency desired
for other uses. The resulting compromises are a function of the
durability and temporal bundling of the product. If cars and coats
were purchased by the week or by the day rather than at multiyear
intervals, people would be able to experience a larger variety of
these goods.
Whether variety adds or subtracts value, however, depends on the
relative costs of foregone familiarity. For goods with a nontrivial
learning curve, like a new car, familiarity may win out, at least for
some users.138 But this may be changing. We can imagine portable
profiles that auto-adjust the seats and mirrors and instantly recon-
figure touchscreen-based controls to match our preferred arrange-
ment. Alternatively, providers of short-term use rights might tend
toward a limited menu of standard models—a sort of numerus
clausus of goods—to ease transitions. If tastes for familiarity were
strong enough, thinner slicing could mean less rather than more
variety. What is interesting, and empirically uncertain, is the capac-
ity of asset slicing to alter preferences for goods and thereby change
the kinds of things that get produced.139
Relatedly, by providing what amounts to fractional ownership,
slicing arrangements can enable people to obtain access to higher-
quality goods than they could acquire outright.140 For goods with
shallow or nonexistent learning curves, these advantages can com-
bine with variety to bring substantial gains. For example, the ability
138. I thank Lior Strahilevitz for discussions on this point.
139. Umair Haque has suggested that underserved markets might benefit from new busi-
ness models that make products and services available in smaller segments. See HAQUE,
supra note 130, at 129-31, 137. But if the underlying asset that is subdivided (such as a car)
must serve a broad range of tastes, it could become both more widely available and more
standardized, depending on the assumptions that we make about consumer preferences. For
a related discussion of how high fixed costs can constrain product offerings, see JOEL
WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET: WHY YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT
100-07 (2007).
140. See BARZEL, supra note 47, at 63 (observing that tools for amateur users “are often
low-cost, low-quality versions of superior professional-quality tools,” and that professional-
grade tools can be made more widely available through rental markets).
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to diversify and upgrade one’s wardrobe provides a primary impetus
for short-term clothing rental services such as Rent the Runway.141
Other claimed advantages of this model, such as reducing the
overall production of cloth,142 are far less clear. The analysis here is
a bit like that for the toothbrush. Given secondhand and recycling
opportunities for fabrics, people might ultimately get comparable
amounts of use out of the cloth that is produced under sharing and
traditional models, whether quickly or slowly.
An intriguing question is whether more “fashion value” can be
wrung from a given outfit through arrangements that enable it to
be worn by many people. If the window of fashionability were fixed,
the slicing arrangement might enable more people to be more
fashionable more of the time. In fact, fashionability seems like a
status good that is inherently limited. If fashions diffuse more
quickly through new platforms, fashion cycles may speed up accord-
ingly.143 We would need to know what “wears out” the fashionability
of an outfit: Is it the mere passage of time, or the number of times
people observe the style being worn? As this example suggests, the
benefits one can derive from property may be endogenous to the
arrangements that exist for slicing it up or bundling it together.
3. Responsibility and Residual Claims
A boundary exclusion model internalizes the effects of an owner’s
acts—insofar as those effects fall within the property’s bounds.
Although spillovers across boundaries are common and imperfectly
addressed, spillovers across time can be obviated (at least in theory)
by granting the owner the full temporal arrow of ownership. She
can, of course, transfer the property at any point, but the sales price
should reflect whatever positive or negative effects her activities
141. See, e.g., Our Vision, RENT THE RUNWAY, https://www.renttherunway.com/about-us
[https://perma.cc/JMS8-96DV] (touting an “unlimited closet”).
142. See Anna Soler Perlacia et al., Collaborative Consumption: Live Fashion, Don’t Own
It 6-7 (Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=
2860021 [https://perma.cc/6Z33-QM9C].
143. For a discussion of the effect of copying on fashion cycles, see Kal Raustiala &
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion
Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1718-28 (2006).
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have had on the property.144 The investment incentive that comes
from internalizing positive effects—reaping where one sows—forms
a core economic justification of ownership.145 Significantly, these
incentive effects extend to simply taking care of the property so that
it does not deteriorate. The owner can form contracts with others to
maintain the property, but she is the residual claimant—the one
who, at the end of the day, will benefit or suffer from the effects of
whatever happens to the asset.146
It is easy to overstate this “responsibility” facet of full ownership.
Owners may be myopic or misinformed, and may do a poor job man-
aging their property. They can degrade the property and walk away
from it. Even though the common law precludes landowners from
legally abandoning fee interests, they can avoid responsibility by
simply decamping, if they are judgment proof, or by transferring the
property to another judgment-proof party.147 Nonetheless, to the
extent that an owner plans to continue using the property in the
future, she might be expected to take better care of it than if it were
going to be handed off to a stranger.
New business models for slicing up access to resources can create
governance systems to stand in for the “automatic” internalization
that long-term ownership accomplishes.148 Those who abuse their
rental properties can be fined or penalized. But a problem remains
if some of the relevant costs are not contained within the overall
envelope of the slicing enterprise, and instead spill over to third
parties. Regulation is of course possible, but it adds to the overall
costs of the new arrangement and must be taken into account in
assessing the value of the shift. Once ownership is unbundled, the
societal functions that the bundling served must be replicated in
some other way.
144. See Demsetz, supra note 3, at 355.
145. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., BARZEL, supra note 47, at 78-80; Smith, supra note 14, at 1795-97.
147. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 401 (2010).
148. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China,
1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 281, 284 (2012) (“When a private farmer is entitled
to keep a crop he grows, for example, he is automatically rewarded for choosing the best crop
to plant, planting at the right time, weeding, applying fertilizer, fallowing a field when
appropriate, and so on.”).
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Scholarship on the commons is instructive on this score. For
example, Elinor Ostrom discusses a “wintering” rule used to control
overgrazing in the Swiss Alps: no one could graze more cattle on the
pasture than they could sustain over the winter.149 The costs of win-
ter feeding thus effectively rationed the use of the commons.150 No
one could skim disproportionate benefits from the commons by
buying cattle, grazing them, and selling them before the costly win-
ter season kicked in. Exclusive ownership of both pasture and cow
would have constrained grazing in a different way, but those
constraining effects could be partially replicated by the wintering
rule while keeping the pasture as a commons.
The temporal bundling accomplished by traditional ownership
automatically performs a similar rationing function by requiring
people to bear the costs of ownership over time. If one wants to own
a car, one must also acquire rights to park it somewhere, pay to
license it, and keep it reasonably maintained. A major impetus for
thinner slicing is relief from some of the burdens of constant
ownership. But for the same reason, reducing the continuity of
ownership raises concerns about externalities. For example,
pressing questions about externalities surround ride-hailing ser-
vices, which have gained much of their tremendous popularity by
relieving riders of the burdens of parking.151
Keeping cars constantly in circulation should translate into less
parking. But recent work suggesting that these services contribute
to congestion raises an important question: are the cars effectively
being stored in traffic in between trips?152 Are the public roads
themselves being appropriated as an adjunct to the business model?
Unpriced roads are already susceptible to congestion because
drivers do not bear the full effects of their entry.153 But the practical
149. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 62 (1990).
150. See id.
151. See Regina R. Clewlow & Gouri Shankar Mishra, Disruptive Transportation: The
Adoption, Utilization, and Impacts of Ride-Hailing in the United States 1 (UC Davis Inst. of
Transp. Studies, Working Paper No. UCD-ITS-RR-17-07, 2017).
152. See Bruce Schaller, Empty Seats, Full Streets: Fixing Manhattan’s Traffic Problem 12,
(Dec. 21, 2017), http://schallerconsult.com/rideservices/emptyseats.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CM73-B8PM].
153. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-119, TRAFFIC CONGESTION:
ROAD PRICING CAN HELP REDUCE CONGESTION, BUT EQUITY CONCERNS MAY GROW 3 (2012).
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requirement that anyone who drives must also park provides a
partial check, one that has now been lifted through fleets of
circulating drivers. An analogue to the wintering rule might place
offsetting responsibilities on platform providers for each car added
to the commons. We need not go back to the old model to see the
externality in the picture and understand the need to fix it.
IV. POST-EXCLUSION PROPERTY?
The foregoing analysis identified some shortcomings in an exclu-
sion-centric model of property rights. Boundaries are no longer a
robust proxy for strong complementarity, due to both the increasing
interdependence among separately owned entitlements and the
decreasing significance of continuous possession.154 The costs of
boundary exclusion have also gone up, both because complemen-
tarities among properties raise the frequency and cost of monopoly
holdout dynamics, and because continual possession imposes in-
creasing burdens in space-constrained urban environments.155
These developments do not, however, establish that property has
moved beyond exclusion, or that it should do so. As I have also
emphasized, boundary exclusion and the related thing-based vision
of full ownership carry important benefits that may not (or may not
yet) be possible to replicate through alternative mechanisms.156 The
fact that a given arrangement has become less efficacious and more
costly is not enough reason to jettison it—we must always ask
whether a better alternative exists. The answer, as I hope is clear
by now, is not a categorical yes or no, but rather maybe, sometimes,
depending on context.
This last Part offers a few thoughts on the directions property
might take as it starts to move beyond exclusion. It starts with some
examples of how law might begin to evolve in directions consistent
with the changes detailed above. It closes by addressing a critique:
whether property, properly understood, can ever really move beyond
exclusion.
154. See supra Parts II.A., III.A.
155. See supra Parts II.B., III.A.
156. See supra Part III.B.
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A. What Now?
The shifting nature of complementarities among and within en-
titlements suggests some possible directions in which property
might evolve. While a full account of the possibilities is beyond the
scope of this Article, a few examples and observations will help to
illustrate.
1. Land Use Beyond Exclusion
Interdependence among pieces of real property has been ad-
dressed to date through an array of land use controls: nuisance,
covenants, and zoning. In one sense, these controls can be viewed as
moving “beyond exclusion” and squarely into the realm of gover-
nance. They explicitly focus on spillovers and are thus premised on
the imperfect containment that boundaries perform.157 At the same
time, however, modern land use controls are infused with an ex-
clusion mentality. Zoning excludes classes of uses, based (at best) on
predictions about their likely spillover effects.158 Covenants are
commonly deployed in private communities that, whether gated or
not, are premised on expanding a circle of control to encompass the
whole neighborhood.159 Nuisance does consider actual impacts, but
addresses only a subset of them—negative spillovers that rise to a
certain level of substantiality.160 None of these controls are focused
157. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22, at 980-83.
158. Exclusionary land use controls may be based on prejudices and stereotypes rather
than any actual spillovers; they may also be based on fiscal, political, or monopolistic motives.
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS
IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163, 173-77 (William A. Fischel ed.,
2006); William T. Bogart, “What Big Teeth You Have!”: Identifying the Motivations for Exclu-
sionary Zoning, 30 URB. STUD. 1669, 1671-72 (1993); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries
of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1855-56, 1870-74
(1994). The political power and risk aversion of homeowners play a large role. See generally
FISCHEL, supra note 48.
159. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 14, at 23-24, 55-56.
160. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“There is
liability for a nuisance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would
be suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition and used
for a normal purpose.”).
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on the most pressing urban land use challenge: how to put together
complementary uses to maximize agglomeration benefits.161
A modest move in that direction would entail focusing more
explicitly on actual impacts experienced by neighbors, both positive
and negative, rather than on summarily excluding classes of uses.
The idea of impact-based zoning—performance zoning—is not new,
but it has not yet been widely implemented.162 For example, instead
of banning all commercial or industrial uses, a performance zoning
code might simply ban uses that generate a certain amount of noise
or traffic.163 Conversely, in an area where foot traffic generates
important benefits, businesses locating in the area might be re-
quired to generate minimum numbers of customers on average.164
This family of approaches has become increasingly feasible with
the rise of widely available tools for gathering and aggregating
information about the effects of activities carried out on land.165 For
example, smartphone apps enable dispersed monitoring and report-
ing using a tool that most adults now carry with them at all times.166
Other means of gathering and aggregating data would be trivial to
implement with readily available technologies.167 The expanding
ability to secure large amounts of real-time data makes thinkable
161. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 82, at 1398-1401.
162. See, e.g., DONALD L. ELLIOTT, A BETTER WAY TO ZONE: TEN PRINCIPLES TO CREATE
MORE LIVABLE CITIES 23-26 (2008); DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZONING: HOW IT
WORKS 11-13 (1988); John R. Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of
Smart Growth, 35 URB. LAW. 15, 30-32 (2003). See generally Frederick W. Acker, Note,
Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991).
163. See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, DARK AGE AHEAD 153-57 (2004) (discussing a “performance
code” focused on impacts); PORTER, supra note 162, at 11 (explaining how performance zoning
in pure form specifies permissible effects rather than uses).
164. See Fennell, supra note 82, at 1410-12. A related motivation could explain efforts by
local governments to restrict large employers from subsidizing on-site meals for their
employees—a move that has a notable impact on the surrounding businesses. See Nellie
Bowles, San Francisco Officials to Tech Workers: Buy Your Lunch, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/technology/san-francisco-tech-free-lunch.html
[https://perma.cc/5GBU-JYRW]; Wendy Lee & Roland Li, Mountain View’s Unusual Rule for
Facebook: No Free Food, S.F. CHRON. (July 23, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/Mountain-View-s-unusual-rule-for-Facebook-No-13096100.php
[https://perma.cc/CWF5-3KM6].
165. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 391-96
(2013).
166. See id. at 392-94.
167. See id.
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a land use regime that is based on impacts, rather than on invasions
and exclusions.168
The ultimate goal would be to promote the most valuable com-
plementarities among land uses, not just block incompatibilities.
Focusing on impacts can advance that goal, but fully achieving it
would require interjecting more flexibility into real property owner-
ship than presently exists. Individual owners currently hold vetoes
that can block synchronized redevelopment efforts that require the
assembly of parcels.169 This produces a rigidity in urban arrange-
ments that is presently unpriced.170 Instead, ownership comes
equipped for intransigence as part of its standard operating equip-
ment.171 Loosening up land use regulations to refocus on impacts
would help, but because large-scale changes are often necessary to
remake a particular area, monopoly represents a continuing
impediment.
There have been many proposals for breaking through this
deadlock, some of which I have written about elsewhere.172 For
purposes of the current discussion, two observations suffice. First,
to the extent that property’s exclusionary shell imposes substantial
and increasing social costs, it will inevitably be softened or broken
down in some fashion.173 Eminent domain already provides a brute-
force alternative, and large-scale concentrated ownership offers
another possibility that also carries significant drawbacks.174
Finding ways to enable people to opt into ownership regimes that
are designed from the outset to be less permanent or less rooted is
an underexplored alternative.175
168. See id. at 395-96.
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L., Sept. 2011, at 22
(discussing rigidities associated with ownership and considering responses to it); T. Nicolaus
Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial Externalities,
66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990) (suggesting taxation on the right to remain as a response to
the flexibility that landowners withdraw from society’s overall fund).
171. See Fennell, supra note 170, at 3-4, 14-16.
172. See, e.g., id. at 24-31; Fennell, supra note 103, at 1480-1504.
173. See Fennell, supra note 103, at 1463-64.
174. See id. at 1461-62, 1469, 1508-09.
175. For an extended discussion of these points, see id. at 1479-1504.
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Second, solutions to problems of thwarted complementarities
must be sensitive to existing temporal and spatial complementar-
ities—including those that involve separately owned entitlements,
such as the homes that make up a close-knit community. One
possibility would establish designated districts in which property
could be taken (with compensation) after a certain amount of time,
but only if the option to take were exercised on an all-or-nothing
basis.176 Another set of ideas would build on land readjustment
models that enable areas to be spatially rearranged in ways that
alter people’s existing holdings but guarantee them the right to
remain within the reconfigured community.177
2. Unbundling and Rebundling
The changes currently afoot in property regimes have an interest-
ingly bidirectional character: property has never been more inter-
dependent, but it has also never been easier to divide up into
smaller slices. Bundles and patterns of property holdings are now
a primary source of value, even as unbundling and disaggregation
continues apace. We cannot predict a simple trajectory toward frag-
mentation, nor one toward ever-expanding consolidation. Instead,
property is changing from a thing that contains a stream of benefits
to a stream of benefits that implicates things. Finding ways to
maximize, capture, and recombine those benefit streams is the es-
sential modern task of property.
The water metaphor is not accidental. Land-based ways of de-
fining and regulating property have proved inapposite to fugitive
resources such as water, oil, and wildlife populations.178 Making the
most of resources requires tracing the particular ways in which they
deliver value and shaping entitlements accordingly. Urbanization
176. See id. at 1482-85.
177. For background on this approach, which has many variations, see, for example,
ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (Yu-Hung Hong
& Barrie Needham eds., 2007).
178. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329,
351 (1996) (asking how our conceptions of property might be different if water rather than
land had served as “our chief symbol for property”); Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck,
Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2514-19 (2015)
(discussing challenges of coordinating the management of “landscape-level resources”).
2019] PROPERTY BEYOND EXCLUSION 569
and technological change have brought about a profound shift in
how resources deliver value to people, one in which reconfigurability
looms large.179 It is not just a matter of how to best reconfigure en-
titlements at one moment, but rather how to set up the institution
of property so that reconfiguration can occur again and again as
needs change.180
Part of making property reconfigurable is recognizing the full set
of conditions necessary for more flexible property arrangements. For
example, condominiums that either do or do not come with parking
spaces cannot readily accommodate fractional car ownership.181
Consider also the interplay between ownership of personal belong-
ings and of real estate. If every piece of personal property one
needed to use on a given day could be instantly delivered to what-
ever location one happened to be occupying, the temporal economies
of scale associated with sustained ownership of real property would
disappear. We can see a similar phenomenon playing out in work-
places where people no longer have permanent claims on particular
offices, but rather are assigned to floating workstations—an
arrangement made feasible by technologies that make certain kinds
of work highly portable.182
More broadly, property ownership’s temporal bundling can be
viewed as an artifact of imperfect portability. It amounts to a type
of indivisibility—components that cannot be detached from their
current location or from the current owner’s hands without loss of
value. But not all existing sets of entitlements lose value when they
are broken apart; sometimes disaggregation facilitates a far more
valuable reconfiguration. As this analysis has emphasized, the
packages into which property has traditionally been bundled should
not be viewed as inevitable; rather, they are only as good and as
durable as the contingencies that shaped them in the first place.
179. See Fennell, supra note 103, at 1474-77.
180. See, e.g., id. at 1496-97.
181. I thank Lior Strahilevitz for this example.
182. See, e.g., Sue Shellenbarger, Don’t Get Too Used to Your Own Desk, WALL ST. J. (May
15, 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-get-too-used-to-your-own-desk-152639
0258 [https://perma.cc/ND3H-9NWP].
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B. Objections
There are many substantive objections that might be made to
specific changes in property arrangements, some of which have been
alluded to already. In this last Section, I want to take on the meta-
critique implicit in the question of whether property beyond
exclusion is a logical or conceptual impossibility. Two challenges
might be mounted against the possibility of property beyond
exclusion. Predictably, the first relates to how we conceptualize
property and the second relates to the meaning and limits of the
word exclusion.
First, to the extent that exclusion is understood as a defining
characteristic of property, one might dispute that there is anything
recognizable as property that lies beyond exclusion. Because even
scholars who emphasize exclusion recognize a role for governance,
the objection cannot be to the use of the word “property” to encom-
pass strategies other than boundary exclusion.183 Nonetheless, one
might contend that any system of resource management that does
not have exclusion as its core strategy (or that eschews exclusion
altogether) cannot count as property.184
Definitions should be assessed by their usefulness.185 By that
benchmark, we must decide whether it is more useful to toss all
resource access arrangements into the property bucket or reserve
that category for institutional arrangements that exhibit certain
structural or formal features.186 As a property professor who would
like to continue being one, I have self-interested reasons to favor the
former approach. But treating property as a functional category also
has a conceptual advantage: it allows the complementarities that lie
behind resource arrangements to take center stage. As the manage-
ment of resources becomes increasingly fine-grained, the category
183. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 1693-94.
184. See, e.g., id. at 1705 (“Exclusion is at the core of [property’s] architecture because it
is a default, a convenient starting point.”); Merrill, supra note 1, at 730 (“Deny someone the
exclusion right and they do not have property.”).
185. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373 (1954)
(“[A]sking whether a definition is true or false is a meaningless question. But we can ask
whether a definition is useful or useless.”).
186. For one view of property’s essential features, see Chang & Smith, supra note 25, at
30-35.
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of property may start to bump into contract, but the varied solutions
to resource dilemmas have enough systemic implications that they
should be treated together. There is nothing inevitable about the
doctrinal categories that we use, however, and my primary concern
is not with labels but with coming up with the best ways of structur-
ing access to resources.
The second critique comes from the opposite direction, question-
ing whether it is even logically possible for a resource arrangement
to diverge from an exclusion model. At least when we are talking
about rival resources like real and personal property, it might seem
that any affirmative use implies exclusion of all other uses. Is it not,
then, exclusion all the way down? The answer depends, again, on
how we define terms, and for what purpose. In this Article, I have
defined exclusion as an overinclusive strategy that relies on bound-
ary defense, not as a synonym for the rival nature of tangible
resources.187 This is consistent with the usage in the literature,188
and it is essential to treating exclusion as a conscious strategy
rather than as an inevitability or a tautology.
Regardless of what we choose to call it, there is something con-
ceptually significant about more closely tailoring entitlements in
time and space to fit the value that users derive from resources. The
distinction drawn in the commons literature between resource sys-
tems, or “stocks” (such as a fishery), and resource units, or “flows”
(such as individual fish), is illustrative.189 Whether or not one
thinks property can go beyond exclusion, resource access can
morph from a modality that focuses on stocks to one that focuses on
flows.190 Although one can comprehensibly speak of having private
exclusionary rights to the fish that one is in the act of catching, an
“own what you catch” approach is still a much different way of
187. See supra Part I.A. For discussion of different ways of using the term “exclusion” (and
a defense of an alternative approach in a different context), see Lee Anne Fennell, Common
Interest Tragedies, 98 NW.U. L. REV. 907, 939 (2004).
188. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 18, at S467-74.
189. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 149, at 30-33; Dean Lueck, First Possession as the Basis
of Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 200, 202 (Terry L.
Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).
190. See Lueck, supra note 189, at 202-03 (discussing different ownership arrangements
for stocks and flows).
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parceling out access than putting a fence around the entire fish
pond.191
CONCLUSION
Although real and personal property often seem mired in the
past, societal changes can and should (and will) alter what owner-
ship means.192 Traditional boundary exclusion, although tightly
linked to popular conceptions of property, turns out to be just one
possible technology for doing property’s work of pairing inputs and
outcomes. And it is a technology in decline. Exclusion will remain
important in some contexts, but it cannot remain property’s go-to
strategy in all domains.
The simple architecture of boundary exclusion assumes that
resource control is best managed in continuous and contiguous
lumps of ownership, and that physical invasions represent the most
significant sources of interference with resource use and invest-
ment. Neither assumption is warranted today. Exclusion and the
thing-based model it entails have become both less efficacious and
more costly. Boundaries no longer reliably group together comple-
mentary elements. Meanwhile, alternatives that have historically
been too costly to countenance are beginning to gain ground, from
fine-grained assessment of impacts to microtransactions over ex-
cess capacity.
Some of these new resource models will succeed and others will
not. What matters more than predictions about the content of
evolving property arrangements is the fact of evolution itself, and
the underlying logic of property’s work in grouping together com-
ponents that work together to produce value. Property’s future lies
in reconfigurability, and in a flexibility capable of capitalizing on
complements as they arise and change.
191. That even an “own what you catch” regime incorporates a certain degree of exclusion
can be seen by contrasting a regime in which caught fish remain up for grabs. See Heller,
supra note 99, at 675 & n.246.
192. See generally Demsetz, supra note 3.
